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Abstract 
Standards and technologies (e.g. in the area of web services) will strongly change IT-based communi-
cation. However, the decision of an agent (e.g. a firm) to adopt a standard is accompanied by the risk 
that other agents do not adopt the standard as well. The interdependencies among the agents’ stand-
ardization decisions due to positive network effects result in a coordination problem called “standard-
ization problem”. If each agent autonomously decides about the adoption of a standard based on in-
complete information about the other agents (e.g. unknown cost structure), this problem is character-
ized by a decentralized decision structure and incomplete information. A well-known approach in this 
context is the Decentralized Standardization Model. Based on analysing methodical issues of this 
model, we propose a novel approach that explicitly and consistently takes into account the interde-
pendencies among the adoption decisions by means of a system of inequalities. Game theoretical 
analyses reveal that this approach goes along with higher average net standardization benefits per 
agent as well as a lower fraction of incorrect individual agents’ decisions than the Decentralized 
Standardization Model. 
Keywords: Communication Standards, Network Effects, Standardization Problem, Decentralized 
Standardization Model. 
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1 Introduction 
Communication and technology standards that enable a compatible information exchange between 
firms, business units, or individual information systems play an important role in times of global value 
chains. In this context, a standard represents a specified and established norm or rules of a technical 
system. Standards in the domain of web services or the semantic web may serve as examples. In litera-
ture, standardization which constitutes the process of establishing standards is widely studied using 
diffusion and adoption models. Diffusion models primarily focus on the macro level process of the 
dispersion of objects like information, products, innovations, and standards. Examples of diffusion 
models are the Exponential Diffusion Model, the Logistic Diffusion Model, and the Markov Represen-
tation of a diffusion process (e.g. Bass, 1969; Mahajan and Peterson, 1985; Rogers, 1995; Wejnert, 
2002). In contrast, adoption models concentrate on the micro level of individual standardization deci-
sions of agents (e.g. firms). Adoption models elaborate the question whether or not an individual agent 
establishes a new standard, for example. Davis et al. (1989) argue that aggregating micro level adop-
tion decisions leads to diffusion processes on a macro level. 
In the following, we focus on adoption models representing the decision behaviour of (potential) users 
of a new standard with respect to their cost and benefit. Such economic considerations have been dis-
cussed in many works referring first and foremost to the theory of positive network effects (e.g. Beck 
et al., 2008; Besen and Farrell, 1994; Farrell and Saloner, 1985, 1986, 1988; Katz and Shapiro, 1985; 
Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995; Matutes and Regibeau, 1988; Weitzel et al., 2003a, 2003c, 2006). Due 
to positive network effects, adopting a standard becomes basically more desirable if other agents adopt 
it as well. Hence, an agent’s cost-benefit position is inherently dependent on the decisions of the other 
agents. These interdependencies among the agents’ standardization decisions due to positive network 
effects result in a coordination problem referred to as the “standardization problem” (Besen and Far-
rell, 1994; Weitzel et al., 2006). This problem can be elaborated from a centralized or a decentralized 
perspective and decision structure. Depending on the decision structure and on whether or not infor-
mation about the individual standardization costs and benefits of the other agents is known (complete 
vs. incomplete information), we can distinguish the problem statements in Table 1. 
 
 Centralized decision structure Decentralized decision structure 
Complete 
information 
about the agents 
in the network 
A central authority decides about the 
agents’ adoption of the new standard based 
on complete information. 
Each individual agent autonomously de-
cides about the adoption of the new stand-
ard based on complete information about 
the other agents in the network. 
Incomplete in-
formation about 
the agents in the 
network 
A central authority decides about the 
agents’ adoption of the new standard based 
on incomplete information (e.g. corporate 
headquarter vs. subsidiary firms). 
Each individual agent autonomously de-
cides about the adoption of the new stand-
ard based on incomplete information about 
the other agents in the network. 
Table 1. Problem Statements in the Context of the Standardization Problem 
Considering a centralized decision structure and complete information, the efficient standardization 
decisions are the ones that lead to the highest net standardization benefit for the entire network (Weit-
zel et al., 2003a). However, in many realistic decision situations (e.g. in case of different firms), all 
agents make their own autonomous decisions about the adoption (decentralized decision structure) and 
have to decide under uncertainty since they do not have complete information about the individual 
standardization costs and benefits of the other agents. Currently, this perspective becomes increasingly 
important to acquire a better understanding of the economics of IS standards and managerial implica-
tions (for a discussion of standardization decisions and efforts in firms cf. e.g. Block and Köllinger, 
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2007; Flügge, 2010; Techatassanasoontorn and Suo, 2011; Weitzel et al., 2006). Our problem context 
can be specified as follows: 
We focus on networks of autonomously deciding agents who have incomplete information about 
the individual standardization costs and benefits of the other agents in the network (cf. bottom 
right corner of Table 1). Thereby, we concentrate especially on methodical aspects of formal 
standardization models which represent the individual decision behaviour of the agents who have 
to decide under uncertainty whether or not to adopt a standard. 
Elaborating this problem context, several approaches in the field of economics have to be taken into 
account (e.g. Besen and Farrell, 1994; Farrell and Saloner, 1985, 1986, 1988; Katz and Shapiro, 1985; 
Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995; Matutes and Regibeau, 1988). Mostly, these works employ equilibrium 
analyses to explain phenomena like the start-up problem, market failure, and market instabilities. 
However, these approaches do not aim at a formal standardization model capturing all relevant IS-
specific aspects and phenomena (Weitzel et al., 2006). Wendt et al. (2000), for instance, state that in-
vestigating network effects in such publications is done either on the basis of general macroeconomic 
aggregate demands, without, however, deriving the aggregation from individual agents’ decision be-
haviour, or based on very restrictive assumptions regarding the micro-economical behaviour of agents. 
This means that network effects as a result of decentralized decisions of individual agents are not ex-
plicitly modelled. As opposed to a plethora of approaches in economics, the standardization decision 
of an individual agent is, however, not solely determined by the mere number of standardizing agents 
in the complete network, but rather by the concrete adoption decisions within the individual communi-
cation network. Thereby, the individual characteristics of each of the agents as well as of the commu-
nication relationships between these agents (e.g. cost structures, saving potentials, position in the net-
work) have to be considered to receive meaningful results. As a part of the information is not known 
to all of the agents (in case of more than two agents), this results in a game with incomplete infor-
mation (cf. section 2.1). As a further consequence, the decisions of other agents in the network are 
both unknown and uncertain. 
Therefore, in the remainder of this paper, we focus on the so-called “Decentralized Standardization 
Model” (cf. e.g. Beck et al., 2008; Buxmann et al., 1999; Weitzel, 2004; Weitzel et al., 2003a, 2003b, 
2006; Wendt et al., 2000), which has its roots in IS. In particular in their MIS Quarterly paper, Weitzel 
et al. (2006) elaborate the Decentralized Standardization Model which allows to “address the question 
of the conditions of particular diffusion behaviours by developing a formal standardization model that 
captures all fragmented phenomena in a unified approach” (Weitzel et al., 2006, p. 489). Many articles 
(e.g. Kauffman and Kumar, 2008; Lee and Mendelson, 2007; McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009; 
Techatassanasoontorn and Suo, 2011; Venkatesh, 2006; Widjaja and Buxmann, 2009) refer to this 
model and discuss respective findings. 
In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of the Decentralized Standardization Model from a 
game theoretical perspective (non-cooperative game). Each agent can decide for or against a standard 
whereas the resulting net benefit depends on the strategies chosen by the other agents. The model is 
based on game theoretical equilibrium analysis (Weitzel et al., 2006) to examine both the individual 
adoption behaviour and the resulting economic consequences. Specially, the model explicates whether 
or not an individual agent chooses the strategy to adopt a standard based on incomplete information 
regarding the cost structures of the other agents. First, we investigate whether the Decentralized 
Standardization Model represents a decision behaviour of agents who act individually rational (cf. 
Rapoport, 2001). Our analysis reveals some methodical shortcomings of this model. Hence, we em-
ploy analytical modelling (cf. Meredith et al., 1989) and develop an adapted approach which consti-
tutes a second contribution of this paper. The adapted approach addresses the shortcomings by explic-
itly taking into account the interdependencies among the standardization decisions. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we provide a detailed discussion of 
the Decentralized Standardization Model. Based on this, we identify important methodical shortcom-
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ings and conduct a game theoretical analysis by means of a simulation study to demonstrate the effects 
of these methodical shortcomings. To address these issues, in Section 3, we propose an adapted ap-
proach to represent the agents’ individual decision behaviour. The evaluation of our approach is also 
based on game theoretical considerations and a simulation study. In the last section, we conclude with 
a critical summary of our findings and provide an outlook on future research. 
2 Analysing the Decentralized Standardization Model 
In the following, we provide an in-depth discussion of the Decentralized Standardization Model (re-
garding the details of this model we refer to Weitzel et al., 2006). Afterwards, from a game theoretical 
perspective, we elaborate on methodical shortcomings of this approach. 
2.1 Discussion of the Decentralized Standardization Model 
To analyse the decision behaviour of individual agents in communication networks, the Decentralized 
Standardization Model is based on a directed network (cf. e.g. Weitzel et al., 2006). In this network, 
each agent is represented by a node i  {1, 2, …, n}. The directed edges (i, j) (with i, j  {1, 2, …, n}, 
i ≠ j) represent the information exchange between these agents. The weights cij  √+ assigned to the 
edges (i, j) denote the individual information costs arising for agent i due to the information exchange 
with agent j using proprietary communication technologies. Initially, the Decentralized Standardiza-
tion Model is based on a full-density network which implies that there is information exchange be-
tween each pair of agents i and j (with i, j  {1, 2, …, n}, i ≠ j). However, this assumption can easily 
be relaxed in favour of any given network topology (cf. e.g. Westarp and Wendt, 2000). 
If agent i adopts the new standard, this agent has the possibility to save information costs cij. It is im-
portant to note that the information costs cij can be saved if and only if both agents i and j standardize 
(the basic model is a one-standard model which can, however, be extended (cf. Weitzel et al., 2006)). 
Ex ante (i.e. before agent i decides whether or not to adopt the new standard) agent i does not know 
whether the other agents j will adopt the standard. The decision of agent i to adopt the standard goes 
along with standardization costs Ki  √+ which have to be opposed to the potential cost savings cij 
(which does not necessarily mean that no costs occur in case of standardization, the information costs 
cij can rather also be interpreted as the potential savings along the respective edge). 
Adopting a standard becomes more economically desirable if further agents adopt this standard as 
well. The interdependencies among the standardization decisions due to positive network effects result 
in a coordination problem called standardization problem (Besen and Farrell, 1994; Weitzel et al., 
2006). In decentralized networks with autonomously deciding agents, this standardization problem 
arises for each single agent. Thereby, “given autonomous agents and the availability of a realistic in-
formation set, the decentralized standardization problem is mainly a problem of anticipating the stand-
ardization decisions of others” (Weitzel 2004, p. 54). 
Regarding the information set available for the autonomous agents, in the Decentralized Standardiza-
tion Model it is assumed that each agent i knows the following (Weitzel et al., 2006): (1) the standard-
ization costs Kj of all agents j in the network; (2) the information costs cij and cji directly associated 
with agent i (i.e. cij and cji j ≠ i); and (3) the number of agents in the network n. In contrast, agent i 
does not know the information costs cjk between two other agents j and k (with j ≠ k and j, k ≠ i). Weit-
zel et al. (2006, p. 494) emphasize that this information set is realistic and refer to empirical research 
that “shows that these data are, in fact, usually available to the deciders.” In addition, in the Decentral-
ized Standardization Model neither a notification of the unknown information costs and standardiza-
tion decisions of all agents nor coordination mechanisms like “cheap talk” (cf. Farrell, 1987) are con-
sidered. 
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Due to incomplete information regarding the information costs of the other agents in the network, each 
agent i has to decide under uncertainty whether or not to adopt the standard. In the Decentralized 
Standardization Model, this decision behaviour of each agent i is modelled as follows: In a first step, 
agent i determines the probabilities pij with which agent i supposes that the other agents j (j ≠ i) in the 
network will adopt the standard. On this basis agent i decides based on the expected value E(Si) of the 
savings in communication costs (cf. Term (1)). Hence, each agent i adopts the new standard if and on-
ly if the expected value E(Si) – i.e. the difference between the agent’s expected savings in information 
costs cij and the standardization costs Ki – is positive. 
 
1
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Term (1) reveals that determining the probabilities pij constitutes the core of the decentralized decision 
behaviour since these probabilities pij are the only variables which are unknown to agent i. To deter-
mine the probabilities pij that other agents j (with j ≠ i) will adopt the standard from the perspective of 
agent i, in the Decentralized Standardization Model the following quotient is proposed: 
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The numerator describes – from the perspective of agent i – the expected savings E(Sj) in communica-
tion costs through standardization for agent j. This means that agent i anticipates the expected savings 
for agent j to determine the probability pij that agent j will adopt the standard. The denominator con-
tains the expected savings in information costs of agent j. Hence, the quotient represents the expected 
net benefits (expected gross benefits minus costs) divided by the expected gross benefits of standardi-
zation for agent j. Using this denominator, Term (2) is normalized to values for the probability pij 
which are less or equal to one. The higher the standardization costs Kj – ceteris paribus – are, the 
smaller is the probability pij that agent j adopts the standard and vice versa. If the quotient is negative 
(i.e. the standardization costs are higher than the expected gross standardization benefits), the maxi-
mum function ensures that no probabilities smaller than zero are determined. 
Agent i, however, does not know the probabilities pjk which are part of Term (2) (i.e., the probabilities 
with which agent j supposes that the other agents k will adopt the standard). In the Decentralized 
Standardization Model, it is therefore assumed that pjk = 1 holds for all agents j and k (with j ≠ k and 
j, k ≠ i) to determine pij. This means when determining the probability pij it is assumed that all other 
agents k will adopt the standard with certainty (i.e. the maximum savings in communication costs and 
thus the best case scenario are assumed). Hence, it is expected that through standardization agent j can 
save all information costs cjk. As agent i does not know these costs cjk, it is further assumed that agent i 
takes the known information costs cji as representative for the unknown information costs cjk of agent j 
(with j ≠ k and j, k ≠ i). On this basis, Term (2) to determine the probability pij in the Decentralized 
Standardization Model can be denoted as follows (cf. Weitzel et al., 2006): 
 





 0;
)1(
)1(
max
nc
Knc
p
ji
jji
ij  (3) 
The numerator represents the expected net standardization benefit for agent j, if all other agents adopt 
the standard. The denominator normalizes the values for the probability pij to less or equal to one. If 
the quotient results in a value less or equal to zero (i.e. cji . (n - 1) - Kj ≤ 0), then pij = 0 holds. 
Using Term (3) to determine the probabilities pij with which agent i supposes that the other agents j 
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will adopt the standard, it is possible for agent i to calculate the expected value E(Si) of the savings in 
communication costs through standardization (cf. Term (1)). This leads to the decision of each agent i 
in the Decentralized Standardization Model (agent i adopts the standard if and only if E(Si) > 0 holds). 
2.2 Methodical Shortcomings of the Decentralized Standardization Model 
The Decentralized Standardization Model constitutes a well-known and important approach to expli-
cate the decision behaviour of agents in decentralized networks with incomplete information (cf. 
Terms (1)-(3)) and provides a formal basis to explain and discuss economic aspects of standard diffu-
sion. Nevertheless, there are some methodical shortcomings which are discussed in the following. 
1) In the Decentralized Standardization Model, it is assumed that all other agents k (with k ≠ j) will 
adopt the standard with certainty (i.e. with probability pjk = 1) when agent i determines the proba-
bility pij that agent j will standardize (cf. Term (3)). However, this assumption does not consistently 
reflect the interdependencies among the standardization decisions due to network effects, which are 
a major characteristic of the standardization problem. In the Decentralized Standardization Model, 
on the one hand, it is assumed that agent i uses a probability of pjk = 1 that agent k adopts the stand-
ard when determining pij. On the other hand, it is assumed that agent i also determines the probabil-
ity pik that agent k adopts the standard using Term (3), which may obviously contradict pjk = 1. In 
this respect, the interdependencies among the standardization decisions are not consistently consid-
ered. It may even be argued that the other agents are rather modelled as rigid states of nature than 
as players trying to optimize their individual payoffs. 
2) The Decentralized Standardization Model assumes risk-neutral agents i who standardize if and only 
if the expected value E(Si) of the savings in communication costs is positive (cf. Term (1)). Term 
(3) which defines how to determine the probabilities pij and thus constitutes the core of the decen-
tralized decision behaviour, however, is not consistent with the assumption of risk-neutral agents. 
Term (3) of the Decentralized Standardization Model results in a value of zero for the probabil-
ity pij if and only if cji . (n - 1) - Kj ≤ 0 holds. In this context, as discussed above, by using the factor 
(n - 1) it is assumed that all other agents k (with k ≠ j) adopt the standard with certainty (i.e. all in-
formation costs can be saved due to the fact that pjk = 1 holds). Therefore, Term (3) to determine 
the probabilities pij bases on a best case scenario (i.e. what are the maximum savings in communi-
cation costs for agent j?) and does not account for the uncertainty regarding the standardization de-
cisions of the other agents (i.e. what are the expected savings in communication costs for agent j?). 
A risk-neutral decision maker, however, would rely on expected values instead. 
3) The denominator of the quotient in Term (3) represents the savings in information costs. This way, 
in the Decentralized Standardization Model it is ensured that the values for the probabilities pij are 
normalized to values which are less or equal to one. As a consequence, Term (3) results in a value 
of pij = 1 if and only if the standardization costs are zero and/or the savings in information costs ap-
proach infinity. Apart from these special cases, pij < 1 holds. Even if the expected savings in infor-
mation costs are twice as large compared to the standardization costs, for example, Term (3) results 
in a value of only pij = 0.5. This aspect is also not consistent with the assumption of a risk-neutral 
decision maker who would already adopt a standard if the expected savings in information costs are 
greater than the standardization costs. 
To demonstrate the effects of these methodical shortcomings, a game theoretical analysis of the De-
centralized Standardization Model can be conducted. In this context, each agent or player, respective-
ly, can basically choose between the strategies standardization and no standardization. The net stand-
ardization benefits can be interpreted as the payoff of a player’s strategy that depends on the strategies 
chosen by the other players. Rational players will try to optimize their individual payoffs taking ac-
count of the strategies of the other players when choosing their strategy. This concept of individual 
rationality leads to one or more Nash equilibria (Rapoport, 2001). 
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In the Decentralized Standardization Model, the uncertainty of agent i with regard to the decision be-
haviour of the other agents j is represented by the probabilities pij (cf. Terms (2) and (3)). Due to the 
fact that the model is explicitly grounded on a game theoretical foundation (cf. Weitzel et al., 2006, 
p. 496ff.), the approach ought to represent rational decision behaviour. Otherwise, all findings and ex-
planations founded on this major approach would have to be reconsidered carefully. 
In addition to the Decentralized Standardization Model, two trivial alternative decision behaviours are 
included in the analysis (for a detailed definition cf. e.g. Weitzel et al., 2006): (1) never standardize 
which means that an agent never (i.e. under no circumstances) adopts the standard; and (2) always 
standardize which means that an agent always (i.e. in any decision situation) adopts the standard. 
To conduct the game theoretical analysis based on payoff matrices, many articles (e.g. Weitzel et al. 
2006) proposed and ran simulation studies. A simulation study is necessary due to the complexity of 
the Decentralized Standardization Model in case of more than two agents and incomplete information 
that does not allow for promising analyses of closed-form expressions. This is underlined by the fact 
that the solution of the relatively simple standardization problem for a centralized decision structure 
and complete information cannot be represented in closed-form either (Domschke and Wagner, 2005). 
Modelling the standardization problem focused here as a Bayesian game was explicitly requested by 
Farrell and Saloner (1988, p. 250) as “desirable extension” of their two-player game in 1988, even 
though it has not yet been realised. Moreover, it would be necessary, to extend such a comparatively 
simple two player-game to a N-player game (with N>2) taking into account the following additional 
aspects: the individual characteristics of each single agent (e.g. cost structure) including his communi-
cation relationships (note that in a two-player game it is for agent i not necessary to consider infor-
mation costs cjk between two other agents) and the network effects as the result of concrete decentral-
ized decisions of individual agents (note that this is not trivial for more than two players). To sum up: 
an adequate modelling of the problem would result in an extremely complex Bayesian game whose 
analytical investigation or even solution would be anything but promising. Thus, a simulation study 
has to be carried out (methodically we refer to Bertrand and Fransoo, 2002), which is consistent with 
prior works in this research strand. For instance, according to Beck et al. (2008, p. 416) “interdepend-
encies between micro level phenomena (individual adoption) and macro level phenomena (network 
effects) imply complex system behavior”. Against this background, they suggest the use of simulation 
studies to cope with this challenge (Beck et al., 2008). In addition, using a simulation study to analyse 
the Decentralized Standardization Model is consistent with prior research (cf. e.g. Buxmann, 1996; 
Buxmann et al., 1999; Weitzel et al., 2003a, 2006; Weitzel, 2004). To ensure both comparability and 
objectivity, the parameterization of our simulation study follows the one by Weitzel et al. (2006): 
Networks are generated using approximately (i.e. only positive values of the random variables are 
used) normally distributed random values for the information costs (cij~ND((cij), (cij))) and stand-
ardization costs (Ki~ND((Ki), (Ki))). The expected value of the standardization costs (Ki) is sys-
tematically increased from (Ki) = 0 to (Ki) = 50,000 by increments of 250, while (cij) = 1,000, 
(cij) = 200, and (Ki) = 1,000 as well as the number of agents with n = 35 remain constant. Before 
systematically increasing the parameter (Ki), the simulation process is repeated 50 times. For each 
generated network depending on the agents’ decision behaviour the single standardization decisions 
can be determined easily. Based on all agents’ standardization decisions their ex post standardization 
benefits can be calculated as well. 
Table 2 illustrates the results of the simulation study in the form of a payoff matrix. Over all simula-
tion runs, the payoff matrix contains the average net standardization benefits (payoffs) per agent re-
sulting ex post. The payoff matrix considers the decision behaviours never standardize, always stand-
ardize, and decide according to the Decentralized Standardization Model (short: Decentralized Mod-
el). The rows refer to the decision behaviour of any given agent in the network (without loss of gener-
ality agent 1). The columns refer to the decision behaviours of the other agents in the network (here, 
agents 2-35). As represented by the columns, we assume that besides agent 1 all other agents 2-35 de-
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cide according to the same decision behaviour (i.e. never standardize, always standardize, or Decen-
tralized Model). This is due to the fact that in case a rational decision behaviour exists the rational 
agents 2-35 would decide according to exactly this same decision behaviour. Here, it is important to 
note that this does not necessarily mean that agents 2-35 come – in case of the decision behaviour De-
centralized Model – to the same standardization decisions because the agents’ individual characteris-
tics (e.g. their standardization costs) and information (e.g. with respect to the other agents’ information 
costs) may differ. For each combination of the decision behaviours of agent 1 and agents 2-35, the 
payoffs for agent 1 are denoted in the top left and those for agents 2-35 in the bottom right corner of 
the cells. In such a payoff matrix a decision behaviour of autonomous agents who act individually ra-
tional is characterized by a Nash equilibrium (i.e. ceteris paribus no player can benefit from a change). 
The payoff matrix illustrates that the game has a Nash equilibrium if all agents decide according to the 
decision behaviour always standardize1. This Nash equilibrium results in the highest payoffs of 8,979 
per agent for both agent 1 (row maximum) and agents 2-35 (column maximum) and is indeed Pareto 
optimal. Hence, from a game theoretical perspective an agent should not decide according to the De-
centralized Standardization Model (i.e. according to the decision behaviour Decentralized Model) – in 
fact, in this situation under uncertainty (due to unknown information costs) it would be rational to de-
cide according to the decision behaviour always standardize. Thereby, no agent has an incentive to 
unilaterally change his decision behaviour (i.e. to choose never standardize or Decentralized Model 
instead) or to hypothesize that other agents may decide differently. 
 
 Decision behaviour of agents 2-35 
Never standardize Always standardize Decentralized Model 
agent 1 agents 2-35 agent 1 agents 2-35 agent 1 agents 2-35
D
ec
isi
on
 b
eh
av
io
ur
 
of
 a
ge
nt
 1
 
Never 
standardize 
agent 1 0  0  0  
agents 2-35  0  7,979  8,007 
Always 
standardize 
agent 1 -25,015  8,979  -13,675  
agents 2-35  0  8,979  8,340 
Decentralized 
Model 
agent 1 -2,745  8,551  8,332  
agents 2-35  0  8,311  8,332 
Table 2. Payoff Matrix 
To sum up: The game theoretical analysis based on a simulation study (the parameterization follows 
the one by Weitzel et al., 2006) reveals that the Decentralized Standardization Model does not repre-
sent rational decision behaviour. 
3 An Adapted Approach taking into Account the Interdependencies 
among the Standardization Decisions 
In the following, we address the shortcomings of the Decentralized Standardization Model and pro-
pose an adapted approach. Afterwards, we provide a game theoretical analysis. 
 
                                                     
1 There is another Nash equilibrium if all agents decide according to the decision behaviour Decentralized Model. This Nash 
equilibrium, however, is not Pareto efficient. 
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3.1 Developing an Adapted Approach 
The interdependencies among the agents’ standardization decisions represent the fundamental charac-
teristic of the standardization problem. To take these interdependencies into account when modelling 
an agent’s decentralized decision behaviour, the other agents have to be modelled as players with their 
individual decision behaviour trying to optimize their own individual payoffs. This means, based on 
the information set available, each player has to determine the probabilities that the other agents in the 
network adopt the standard. 
The major idea of the adapted approach is to explicitly consider the probabilities pjk (with k ≠ j) when 
agent i determines the probability pij that another agent j in the network standardizes. But how can 
agent i calculate these probabilities pjk? In this context, when modelling the agents’ decentralized deci-
sion behaviour, we act as follows (without loss of generality, we take the perspective of agent i): 
When determining the probability pij that agent j adopts the standard, agent i takes the probabilities pik, 
which are determinable based on the information set available, as representative for the probabilities 
pjk. This means, that the probability with which agent i supposes that agent k will adopt the standard is 
taken as representative for the probability pjk with which agent j supposes that agent k will adopt the 
standard. The reason is that the probability pik is the best-known information when determining the 
unknown probability pjk from the perspective of agent i. Moreover, by using the probability pik the in-
terdependencies of the standardization decisions can be taken into account as well, since for determin-
ing the probability pik all other probabilities pij (with i ≠ j ≠ k) need to be considered, too (for details cf. 
Term (5)). From the perspective of agent i the expected value Ei(Sj) of the savings in communication 
costs through standardization of agent j can be expressed as denoted in Term (4) (for cjk = cji as pro-
posed by Buxmann et al., 1999; König et al., 1999; Weitzel et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). 
 
jik
n
jkk
jij
i KpcSE  
 ;1
)(  (4) 
As above (cf. Term (1)), a risk-neutral agent i decides based on the expected value 
i
n
ijj ijiji
KpcSE   ;1)(  of his individual savings in communication costs. To be able to calculate 
the expected value E(Si), it is necessary for agent i to determine the probabilities pij for all other 
agents j in the network. As each agent j is assumed to be risk-neutral as well, the decision of agent j 
solely depends on the expected value E(Sj) of his savings in communication costs. This means that 
agent j will adopt the standard if and only if the expected value E(Sj) of his savings is positive. Hence, 
it is consistent for agent i to derive the probability pij based on the expected value Ei(Sj) of the savings 
in communication costs for agent j (cf. Term (4)). 
The same argumentation holds when deriving the probabilities pik for all other agents k (with k ≠ j and 
k ≠ i). Summing up, for agent i this results in a system of n inequalities. Each inequality refers to the 
expected value of the savings in communication costs for a certain agent in the network and contains 
the (n - 1) probabilities that the respective other agents will adopt the standard. Thus, the interdepend-
encies of the standardization decisions are represented by a system of n inequalities, ensuring that each 
determined decision has its impact on all other decisions. The inequalities take account of the fact that 
the agents do not standardize in case of negative expected savings in communication costs (cf. right 
hand side of the inequalities). Using the indicator function )(1 }0{ ijp pij   ensures that the standardization 
costs for agent j (with j ≠ i) occur if and only if agent j standardizes (cf. inequalities 2 to n). The sys-
tem of inequalities is defined as follows: 
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 (5) 
The system of inequalities explicitly and consistently takes into account the interdependencies among 
the standardization decisions of the n agents. On this basis, it is possible for agent i to make his deci-
sion based on the expected value E(Si) of his savings in communication costs. In this respect, agent i 
adopts the standard if and only if the system of inequalities has a solution for pij  [0; 1]. Term (5) 
may have multiple solutions. Each solution refers to a situation where agent i adopts the standard 
while all agents are characterized by non-negative expected savings. To determine the decision of 
agent i, it is not necessary to find the solution which refers to the situation where the number of agents 
who are positive towards the standard is maximal. Indeed, this solution reflects the actual result from 
the perspective of agent i as network effects are positive and each agent aims at maximizing his ex-
pected savings (the inequalities only ensure non-negativity). However, due to the characteristics of 
positive network effects it is clear that given any solution of Term (5) all agents adopting the standard 
in the respective situation also standardize in the solution reflecting this actual result from the perspec-
tive of agent i. A solution of the system of inequalities is characterized by two aspects: On the one 
hand, it is ensured that adopting the standard goes along with a positive expected value E(Si) of the 
savings in communication costs for agent i (cf. first inequality not including the indicator function). 
On the other hand, none of the other agents j (with j ≠ i) in the network expects negative savings in 
communication costs Ei(Sj) due to an adoption of the standard (cf. inequalities 2 to n including the in-
dicator function). 
The adapted approach addresses the shortcomings of the Decentralized Standardization Model: 
1) It is no longer assumed that all other agents k (with k ≠ j and k ≠ i) will adopt the standard with cer-
tainty (i.e. with probability pjk = 1) when agent i determines the probability pij that agent j will 
standardize. Rather, this assumption is avoided and the interdependencies of the standardization 
decisions are taken into account in an explicit and consistent way by a system of inequalities. 
2) When determining the probabilities pij according to the Decentralized Standardization Model, it is 
assumed that all other agents k (with k ≠ j and k ≠ i) will adopt the standard. As a consequence, the 
agents’ decision behaviour is based on a best case scenario (see above). This is not consistent with 
the assumption of risk-neutral agents. In the adapted approach this shortcoming can be avoided. 
The system of inequalities consistently takes into account that all agents base their decisions solely 
on the expected value of their individual savings (and not on maximum savings). 
3) In the Decentralized Standardization Model, the savings in communication costs are divided by the 
savings in information costs in order to normalize the values for the probabilities pij to less or equal 
to one (cf. Terms (2) and (3)). This normalization is not consistent with the assumption of risk-
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neutral agents and may result in a distortion of the determined probabilities. Deciding according to 
the adapted approach avoids this shortcoming. It is characterized by a consistent use of probabili-
ties and considers solely the expected value of the savings in communication costs when determin-
ing the probabilities (cf. Term (5)). This is consistent with the assumption of risk-neutral agents.  
3.2 Game Theoretical Analysis of the Adapted Approach 
In the following, we provide a game theoretical analysis of our approach. For this purpose, we includ-
ed the decision behaviour according to the adapted approach in the simulation study described above 
(parameterization follows Weitzel et al., 2006). To cope with the system of inequalities - which consti-
tutes the core of the decision behaviour according to the adapted approach – we implemented a Java 
application and used routines of the mathematics software Mathematica™. In addition, we conducted 
several test procedures like Structured Walk-through, Unit testing, and Extreme value testing to verify 
the implemented application and the results of the simulation study. 
Table 3 shows the results of the extended simulation study as a payoff matrix. Unlike Table 2, it also 
includes decide according to the adapted approach (short: Adapted Model). Again, the rows refer to 
any given agent in the network (without loss of generality agent 1), and the columns to the other 34 
agents in the network (here, agents 2-35). The payoffs for agent 1 are denoted in the top left and those 
for agents 2-35 in the bottom right corner of the respective cells. 
 
 Decision behaviour of agents 2-35 
 Never  
standardize 
Always 
standardize 
Decentralized 
Model 
Adapted  
Model 
agent
1 
agents
2-35 
agent
1 
agents
2-35 
agent
1 
agents 
2-35 
agent 
1 
agents
2-35 
D
ec
isi
on
 b
eh
av
io
ur
 o
f 
ag
en
t 1
 
Never 
standardize 
agent 1 0  0  0  0  
agents 2-35  0  7,979  8,007  9,542 
Always 
standardize 
agent 1 -25,015  8,979  -13,675  -8,664  
agents 2-35  0  8,979  8,340  10,022 
Decentralized 
Model 
agent 1 -2,745  8,551  8,332  8,551  
agents 2-35  0  8,311  8,332  9,874 
Adapted 
Model 
agent 1 -5,835  10,561  5,505  10,005  
agents 2-35  0  8,462  8,340  10,005 
Table 3. Extended Payoff Matrix 
The extended payoff matrix shows that - considering these decision behaviours – a Nash equilibrium 
is constituted when all agents choose to decide according to the adapted approach. The Nash equilibri-
um results in payoffs of 10,005 per agent. Thereby, nobody has an incentive to unilaterally change his 
decision behaviour or to hypothesize that other agents may decide differently since this would lead to 
a reduction in the payoffs (cf. other rows for agent 1). 
The payoff matrices contain average net standardization benefits per agent over all simulation runs. In 
the following, we take a deeper look at the agents’ individual standardization decisions. To evaluate 
different solutions in the context of a decentralized decision structure and incomplete information, the 
(optimal) solution for a decentralized decision structure and complete information can serve as a sound 
reference base (cf. Table 1; Heinrich et al., 2011). Indeed, the solution for a decentralized decision 
structure and complete information would occur in case of incomplete information as well, if – despite 
incomplete information – each agent could perfectly anticipate the standardization decisions of the 
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others. Figure 1 focusses on the fractions of individual agents’ incorrect decisions with respect to the 
solution for a decentralized decision structure and complete information. The single charts compare 
the fractions of individual agents’ incorrect decisions for the Adapted Model with those for the other 
decision behaviours depending on the expected value of the standardization costs (Ki) which is sys-
tematically increased from 0 to 50,000 (cf. parameterization of the simulation study). 
The analysis reveals that, with respect to the solution for a decentralized decision structure and com-
plete information (reference base), deciding according to the adapted approach leads to significantly 
fewer individual agents’ incorrect decisions as opposed to the other decision behaviours. The fractions 
of incorrect individual decisions over all simulation runs are as follows: never standardize: 62%; al-
ways standardize: 38%; Decentralized Model: 28%; and Adapted Model: 14%. It is particularly re-
markable that referring to this reference base deciding according to the adapted approach strictly dom-
inates the decision behaviours Decentralized Model and never standardize in the sense that for all 
351,750 standardization decisions in the simulation study not a single agent is worse off when decid-
ing according to Adapted Model. 
 
Figure 1. Fraction of Individual Agents’ Incorrect Decisions with respect to the Solution for a 
Decentralized Decision Structure and Complete Information 
Another interesting aspect refers to the so-called “standardization gap” which is defined as the differ-
ence in network-wide savings between the solution for a centralized decision structure and complete 
information and the solution for a decentralized decision structure and incomplete information (cf. e.g. 
Lee and Mendelson, 2007). In literature, the standardization gap is used to quantify inefficiencies in 
decision making in terms of “network effect benefits as yet unexploited” (Weitzel et al., 2006, p. 498). 
Here, the simulation study reveals that compared to the Decentralized Standardization Model deciding 
according to the adapted approach leads to a significantly smaller standardization gap: Actually, the 
average standardization gap observed over all simulation runs is about 55,473 instead of 115,199 (in 
case of the Decentralized Standardization Model) which constitutes a reduction of more than 50%. 
To sum up: The simulation study (the parameterization follows Weitzel et al., 2006) reveals that it is 
rational and helps to reduce inefficiencies to explicitly take into account the interdependencies among 
the standardization decisions and decide according to the adapted approach. 
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4 Conclusion, Limitations and Further Research 
In this paper, we focus on the standardization problem for a decentralized decision structure and in-
complete information. We concentrated on methodical aspects of standardization models representing 
the individual decision behaviour of agents who have to decide under uncertainty. The interdependen-
cies among the agents’ standardization decisions are the fundamental characteristic of both the stand-
ardization problem and the network theory. Therefore, we investigated how to take these interdepend-
encies into account when modelling the individual decision behaviour of the agents and developed an 
adapted approach. The results can be summarized as follows: 
1) Compared to the well-known Decentralized Standardization Model, respective discussions (e.g. 
Kauffman and Kumar, 2008; Lee and Mendelson, 2007; McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009; 
Techatassanasoontorn and Suo, 2011; Venkatesh, 2006; Widjaja and Buxmann, 2009) and ap-
proaches in the field of economics (e.g. Farrell and Saloner, 1985, 1986), our approach explicitly 
and consistently takes into account the interdependencies among the standardization decisions of 
the agents in the network. Methodically, our approach is based on a system of inequalities. This 
way, several restrictive assumptions and methodical shortcomings of the Decentralized Standardi-
zation Model are avoided. 
2) A game theoretical analysis based on a simulation study revealed that our approach goes along with 
the highest average net standardization benefits per agent. Furthermore, it is remarkable that refer-
ring to the fractions of incorrect individual agents’ decisions (cf. Figure 1) the proposed adapted 
approach strictly dominates the Decentralized Standardization Model. 
3) In our paper, we mainly focus on methodical aspects of the standardization problem. On the one 
hand, our approach constitutes a theoretical contribution which can serve as a basis for further sci-
entific analyses to get a better understanding of the economics of IS standards. On the other hand, 
the approach may also be apt to make decision makers and managers more aware of the fact that 
(1) standardization decisions are inherently interdependent and that (2) the interdependencies 
among the agents’ standardization decisions have to be adequately taken into account to reduce in-
efficiencies. In this respect, especially the system of inequalities may be valuable which – accord-
ing to empirical research – bases on a realistic information set available to the agents (e.g. firms) in 
practice: It demonstrates what happens to the decision of an agent in case other agents will or will 
not adopt a standard. This may constitute a starting point for fruitful discussions about the interde-
pendencies of standardization decisions. Moreover, analyses show that deciding according to the 
adapted approach (i.e. based on the system of inequalities) can result in considerable economic 
benefit (e.g. the results of the simulation study conducted underpin that the standardization gap is 
reduced significantly). 
The methodical discussions in this paper may constitute the starting point for further research. Existing 
economic interpretations and findings have to be reconsidered carefully, explicitly taking into account 
the interdependencies among the standardization decisions. Due to the adapted decision behaviour, we 
expect differing results. In this context, economic analyses considering multiple periods and different 
network topologies seem to be promising. In particular, competing standards and the resulting adop-
tion patterns for each standard should be analysed with regard to the interdependencies among the de-
cisions and incomplete information. Our approach may provide a suitable basis for these future steps. 
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